Helpdesk & Call Centres

The people trained to help quickly are the ones an attacker calls first.

Most Exposed

Helpdesk, IT support, call centre agents

The Attack

Pretext calls, account recovery fraud, MFA reset abuse

Main Image

"I've lost my phone and I'm locked out" is now one of the most effective opening lines an attacker has.

The attacks we stop:

  • A caller claiming to be a senior employee says they're locked out before an important meeting and pressures the agent to reset their access without the usual checks

  • An attacker who already has a few real details about a staff member calls to "confirm" the rest and walk the agent through resetting multi-factor authentication, quietly enrolling their own device

  • A request comes in to add a new phone number or forwarding rule to an account, small enough to seem harmless, but enough to intercept future login codes

How we protect you:

  • We review who can reset access, verify a caller or restore an account, and where a confident story would be enough to get it done

  • We run controlled exercises that put your agents in front of the kinds of calls and messages a real social engineer would use, calmly and in advance, so the pressure is familiar rather than new when it counts

  • We put a verification step exactly where it is missing, so that resetting access or confirming an identity depends on something an attacker can't talk their way around, rather than on how plausible they sounded


Helpdesk & Call Centres

The people trained to help quickly are the ones an attacker calls first.

Most Exposed

Helpdesk, IT support, call centre agents

The Attack

Pretext calls, account recovery fraud, MFA reset abuse

Main Image

"I've lost my phone and I'm locked out" is now one of the most effective opening lines an attacker has.

The attacks we stop:

  • A caller claiming to be a senior employee says they're locked out before an important meeting and pressures the agent to reset their access without the usual checks

  • An attacker who already has a few real details about a staff member calls to "confirm" the rest and walk the agent through resetting multi-factor authentication, quietly enrolling their own device

  • A request comes in to add a new phone number or forwarding rule to an account, small enough to seem harmless, but enough to intercept future login codes

How we protect you:

  • We review who can reset access, verify a caller or restore an account, and where a confident story would be enough to get it done

  • We run controlled exercises that put your agents in front of the kinds of calls and messages a real social engineer would use, calmly and in advance, so the pressure is familiar rather than new when it counts

  • We put a verification step exactly where it is missing, so that resetting access or confirming an identity depends on something an attacker can't talk their way around, rather than on how plausible they sounded


Helpdesk & Call Centres

The people trained to help quickly are the ones an attacker calls first.

Most Exposed

Helpdesk, IT support, call centre agents

The Attack

Pretext calls, account recovery fraud, MFA reset abuse

Main Image

"I've lost my phone and I'm locked out" is now one of the most effective opening lines an attacker has.

The attacks we stop:

  • A caller claiming to be a senior employee says they're locked out before an important meeting and pressures the agent to reset their access without the usual checks

  • An attacker who already has a few real details about a staff member calls to "confirm" the rest and walk the agent through resetting multi-factor authentication, quietly enrolling their own device

  • A request comes in to add a new phone number or forwarding rule to an account, small enough to seem harmless, but enough to intercept future login codes

How we protect you:

  • We review who can reset access, verify a caller or restore an account, and where a confident story would be enough to get it done

  • We run controlled exercises that put your agents in front of the kinds of calls and messages a real social engineer would use, calmly and in advance, so the pressure is familiar rather than new when it counts

  • We put a verification step exactly where it is missing, so that resetting access or confirming an identity depends on something an attacker can't talk their way around, rather than on how plausible they sounded